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The new French dam safety regulation classifies each dam in 4 classes depending on its height and the volume of water it stores. The 
first two classes require each owner to establish a safety report for an authority review. A main objective of this report is to demonstrate 
that all hazardous scenarios have been taken into account by the dam owner in assessing the risk level and also that sufficient safety 
measures have been specified to reach a global risk as low as reasonably possible. First, considering all existing data and characteristics 
of the dam, the owner has to carry out a risk analysis to identify all failure modes that may occur on dam structure and hydraulic 
equipment. Every potential accident is then characterised in terms of severity of consequences and annual occurrence probability. The 
severity level is assessed quantitatively or qualitatively, using a combination of maps representing the effects of the flood waves and the 
Population At Risks. The probability is assessed using a semi-quantitative method analyzing all scenarios and safety measures involved 
in prevention and protection: the bow-tie approach. This cross analysis implements an iterative approach to highlight complementary 
measures and recommendations and therefore enhance global safety level. 
 





1.1. Dam Safety Regulation 
 
French regulation on hydraulic structures changed in 
2007 with the publication of a decree (n°2077-1735, 11th 
December 2007) that sets new requirements in terms of 
dam and dike safety. Hydraulic structures are classified 
into four classes (A, B, C and D) according to their 
characteristics. Concerning dams, the considered 
parameters are the height (H in meters) above the ground 
surface and the volume (V in cubic meters) of the 
reservoir.  
 
Table 1. Classification of Dams in French Regulation 
Categories Threshold parameters 
A H ≥ 20  
B No A class H² × √V  ≥ 200 and H ≥ 10 
C No A & B classes H² × √V  ≥ 20 and H ≥ 5  
D No A, B & C classes H ≥ 2  
 
The previously referenced decree, among other 
mandatory measures, requires the realization by the 
owner of a safety report for classes A and B dams. This 
safety report is then analysed by the Authorities who 
decide if the report is admissible. If it is not, Authorities 
can ask for supplementary information. 
 
1.2. Objectives of a Safety Report 
 
One of the safety report's objectives is to demonstrate 
that all risks that may occur on the single dam are 
identified and managed. The risk of a dam failure must 
be studied, for example during a flood event or an 
earthquake, but so must all the events (accidents or 
incidents) related to current operations be. The safety 
report also presents the safety measures implemented to 
avoid or limit the accidents and possible additional 
measures to reach a level As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP). 
 
The Ministerial decree of June 12th, 2008 presents the 
standard timetable and content of such a safety report, 
organized into eleven sections: 
0. Non-technical summary of the safety report; 
1. Administrative Information; 
2. Purpose of the Study; 
3. Functional analysis of the structure and its 
environment; 
4. Presentation of the Preventing Major Accidents 
Policy and the Safety Management System; 
5. Identification and characterization of potential 
hazards; 
6. Characterization of natural hazards; 
7. Field experience and feedback; 
8. Identification and characterization of risk in terms of 
probability of occurrence, intensity and kinetics of the 
effects, and severity; 
9. Risk reduction; 
10. Mapping. 
 
Chapters 3 to 7 represent input data needed to lead to the 
assessment and characterisation in terms of severity and 
annual probability developed in chapters 8 and 9. The 
Figure 1 below shows the process of a study focused on 
risk assessment (chapter 8) to determine all the hazards 




Figure 1. Structure of the Safety Report 
 
This article describes the methodology developed by 
INERIS (from the risk assessment step to the risk 
reduction phase) to identify and quantify all the 
accidents. It is divided into 4 parts: 
- Risk analysis, 
- Consequences assessment, 
- Probability assessment, 
- Risk acceptability criteria and risk reduction. 
 
 
2. RISK ANALYSIS 
 
2.1. General Framework 
 
Risk analysis is the first step of risk assessment. Under 
the new French regulation, owners have to identify all 
possible major accident scenarios that could occur on the 
dam, along with the implemented safety measures that 
could stop them or limit their consequences. Scenarios 
leading to a dam failure have to be considered, but not 
only: all failure modes have to be identified, including 
emptying valve failure or spillgate rupture. This 
identification is based on dam characteristics and 
includes dam environment, as a potential extern 
aggressor. This identification also integrates field 
experience. 
 
The French regulation does not make compulsory a 
specific methodology of risk assessment. The owner is 
free to use FMEA, Preliminary Hazard Analysis or any 
other methodology to his or her convenience, as long as 
this choice is justified and leads to an exhaustive list of 
dam failure modes and associated scenarios. 
 
2.2. INERIS Methodology for Scenarios Identification 
 
Risk estimation is supported by a dedicated working 
group. This group is composed of experts and operators 
who have a good knowledge of the dam and the risk 
analysis methodology. The working group fills up a table 
in which each line represents a scenario, as presented on 
Table 2. 
 











       
 
During this analysis, all using modes of the dam have to 
be considered, such as usual operation mode, 
maintenance, emptying and filling of the reservoir, 
operation in times of floods... The flood following the 
failure of an upstream dam is also considered. The 
summary of this table leads to an exhaustive list of 
accidents, with their kinetics and estimated flow straight 
to the dam. 
 
This list can now be reduced. As an example, a flood 
event can lead to a failure mode that would not have 
stronger effects than those already waited downstream 
because of the flood event itself. Then, this failure mode 
is not considered as a potential major accident. 
Therefore, after this selection, the residual list consists of 
all major accidents identified for the dam, with estimated 
flow and kinetics associated. Some of them, at least the 
dam failure, need modelling to obtain data on their 
consequences. Major accident implying lower flows may 
be studied qualitatively, without modelling. 
 
A cross analysis between the consequences of the effects 
of these major accidents and their annual probability 
must be done in order to demonstrate the control of dam 
risks by the owner. 
 
 
3. CONSEQUENCES ASSESSMENT 
 
The consequences assessment of a dam major accident 
by INERIS is based on the superposition of a mapping of 
the flood wave effects and a mapping of the identified 
people exposed to these effects. 
 
3.1. Effects Evaluation 
 
The effects of major accident consequences are 
characterised in terms of local kinetics and intensity. 
Local kinetics is about the time between the arrival of the 
first effects of the wave and its top flow. It can be 
gradual or sudden, depending if the population will be 
able to be evacuated after the arrival of the first effects or 
not.  
 
3.1.1. Local kinetics 
Local kinetics is assessed for each impacted person 
according to two parameters: the flow speed, and the 
flow height, leading to the speed of the rise of water 
level. The French Prevention of Flood Guidelines 
indicates that a water height of 0.5 meters makes a man 
unable to move freely in the flow. It also indicates that a 
flow speed of 0.5 meters per second is a line above 
which a man could be hurt by objects carried along the 
flow or could be carried himself. 
 
If the local flow speed and local speed of the rise of the 
water are both under the speed lines, local kinetics is 
gradual, as an evacuation is considered as possible. If 
not, kinetics is sudden. If speed data are not available, for 
example if there is no modelling and the accident is 
studied qualitatively, kinetics are considered as sudden, 
in a conservative approach. 
 
3.1.2. Local intensity 
The intensity level is assessed for each person by 
comparing local flood flows to reference local return 
flows, as presented by Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Intensity levels used by INERIS  
Intensity level Local flow 
Very strong Q ≥ Q1000-year 
Strong Q100-year ≤ Q < Q1000-year 
Moderate Q10-year ≤ Q < Q100-year 
Weak Q < Q10-year 
 
If local flow data are not available, a conservative 
approach is used, depending on the wave flow at the 
level of the dam. If this flow is inferior to the ten-yearly 
flood flow straight to the dam, INERIS considers that the 
accident wave will deaden very quickly downstream and 
be contained in the river bed. If this flow is superior to 
the ten-yearly flood flow, INERIS considers that the flow 
remains constant along its travel, and this travel stops 
when the flow becomes inferior to the local ten-yearly 
flood flow. The flow is supposed to be contained in the 
river bed, except in some critic points (bridges, roads...) 
where this containment should be confirmed. A special 
attention should be paid for this confirmation, as the 
considered flow should be the wave flow added to the 
natural river flow. 
 
3.1.3. Zoning 
The characterisation in local kinetics and intensity leads 
to a zoning of the effects map: INERIS chose to define 3 
zones, based on a methodology already used for the 
establishment of French emergency plans. This zoning is 
presented by Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Zoning based on intensity and kinetics levels  
 Sudden kinetics Gradual kinetics 
Very strong A A 
Strong A B 
Moderate B C 
Weak B C 
 
A zone is attributed to each person, and so the mapping 




Figure 2. Simplified representation of a zoned effects map 
 
3.2. Impacted People Census 
 
Once the effects are characterised, an identification of the 
impacted people is necessary to assess the severity level. 
INERIS methodology is based on the Population At Risk 
(PAR) parameter. 
 
According to the wave modelling maps, the number of 
people likely to be impacted by the accident flood wave 
is counted. The regulation does not require a precise 
number, but asks for the counting mesh to be fine enough 
to obtain a good estimation of this maximal PAR. The 
census can be based on the Corine Land Cover database, 
which shows land cover mapping. It can also be done by 
adapting the counting methodology used for critical 
industrial infrastructures presented in the section 
“Elements for severity level assessment in safety reports” 
of the circular of May 10th, 2010 which summarizes the 
methodological rules applicable to safety reports, the 
approach of risk reduction at source and plans for 
prevention of technological risks. This methodology 
recommends for example to count 2.5 persons for each 
house, the whole capacity for buildings receiving public, 
etc. 
 
Once the max PAR is determined, global kinetics of the 
accident can justify the use of reduction factors. Global 
kinetics can be of two types: pre-accidental kinetics and 
post-accidental kinetics. Pre-accidental kinetics is the 
time for the accident to occur once pre-incidental drifts 
have been detected. If a pre-incidental drift can be 
detected and therefore the accident predicted soon 
enough to allow an evacuation before the accident 
actually occurs, a reduction factor may be applied to the 
whole max PAR. Post-accidental kinetics is the time of 
the arrival of the wave first effects straight to the 
impacted people. A reduction factor may be applied to 
the part of the max PAR located far enough from the dam 
to be impacted by the first effects of the wave in a time 
longer than the time needed for evacuation. 
 
However, the evaluation of a emergency evacuation plan 
is not easy and reduction factors have to be assessed 
carefully. If this evaluation cannot be done, or if the 
available data cannot be trusted because of too many 
uncertainties, it is safer to consider the max PAR in a 
conservative approach. 
 
3.3. Severity Levels 
 
Once zoning and PAR are available, the severity level 
can be assessed, using the scale as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Severity Levels scale used by INERIS (unit: people 
exposed) 
 Zone A Zone B Zone C 
SL5 ≥ 1,000 ≥ 10,000 ≥ 100,000 
SL4 ≥ 100 and 
< 1,000 
≥ 1,000 and 
 < 10,000 
≥ 10,000 and 
< 100,000 
SL3 ≥ 10 and < 100 ≥ 100 and 
< 1,000 
≥ 1,000 and 
< 10,000 
SL2 < 10 ≥ 10 and < 100 ≥ 100 and 
< 1,000 
SL1  < 10 < 100 
 
To each zone is given a Severity Level (SL) depending 
on its PAR. The global severity level of the accident is 
the maxima of the severity levels of each zone. As a 
result, the Severity Level of an accident whose zoning 




Figure 3. Example of a simplified zoning and PAR associated 
 
 
4. PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 
The risk analysis usually identifies the possible central 
events (example: loss of containment) and their 
consequences (dangerous phenomena), but also, the 
initiating events leading to them. In order to present the 
results of this identification process, INERIS uses 




Figure 4. Example of a bow-tie diagram 
 
The bow-tie diagram is a combination of a simplified 
failure tree and an event tree. It is composed of initiating 
events in the left side of the diagram. Examples of 
initiating events could be a human error in a filling 
procedure, an impact resulting of a vehicle collision, etc. 
These initiating events lead to a central hazardous event 
which is often a loss of containment. Then, the central 
event leads to several dangerous phenomena. 
 
The qualitative identification of initiating events, central 
hazardous events, prevention and protection safety 
barriers and possible consequences realized through the 
implementation of the bow-tie diagram has to be 
considered as a major step of the safety report, leading to 
a probabilistic quantification of the scenarios.  
 
To realize this quantification, when the identification 
step is achieved, the ability of the barriers to prevent the 
occurrence of scenario or to limit the consequences has 
to be evaluated. 
 
4.1. Safety Barriers Evaluation 
 
The barrier analysis is a main issue for the demonstration 
of the risk control, as they usually bring the proof that the 
safety system meets the ALARP requirements. Three 
kinds of safety barriers have been identified: technical 
barriers, human barriers and barriers which gather both 




Figure 5. Safety barrier typology as developed in the INERIS 
methodology 
 
In order to be considered in the French regulatory 
framework, a safety barrier has to meet the following 
requirements. It has to be:  
- Independent: the safety barrier must be 
independent of the cause of the scenario or of 
the scenario itself; 
- Effective: able to fulfil the safety function that it 
was chosen for, in its usage context, for a period 
of operation process independent and 
independent of other safety barriers; 
- With a response time in accordance with the 
kinetics of the scenario; 
- Testable; 
- Covered by preventive maintenance designed to 
guarantee that performance levels are 
maintained over time. 
 
If these requirements are met, the safety barrier can be 
taken into account in the probabilistic quantification of a 
dangerous phenomenon, as it reduces the occurrence 
frequency of a given scenario. The point is then to assess 
the failure probability of a barrier, and so the impact of 
the barrier on the occurrence frequency of an accident. 
There are few data about the failure probability 
on-demand of a specific barrier. Moreover, the available 
data are generally an average of failure rates and are not 
applicable for a specific facility, in a specific 
environment.  
 
The INERIS methodology is based on the “level of 
confidence”. The risk reduction factor of an active barrier 
is calculated using an extrapolation of SIL (Safety 
Integrity level) defined in the norms NF EN 61 508 and 
NF EN 61 511. The approach described in these norms 
has been extended to all active barriers. Concerning 
passive barriers and human barriers, a maximum level of 
confidence has been defined through literature 
researches. The level of confidence is then reduced on 
the basis of different criteria (for more details, see Ω10 
and Ω20 reports, INERIS 2008 and 2009, available on 
INERIS website www.ineris.fr). 
 
When all identified barriers are evaluated, the frequency 
of major accident can be assessed. 
 
4.2. Dangerous Phenomena Probability 
 
As owners are free to choose the methodology to be used 
in the safety report for assessing the occurrence 
probability of a dangerous phenomenon, the 
methodologies can significantly vary. Since 2005, 
INERIS uses the quantitative evaluation “from initiating 
events to dangerous phenomena”, based on the bow-tie 
representation. Two main approaches are used in order to 
estimate the frequency of initiating events. 
 
A first one uses reliability data, or generic frequencies 
obtained by using reliability data. These data can be 
available for failure related to equipment. However, data 
related to human and organizational failures are very 
limited. A second one, used by INERIS, is the 
assessment of the frequencies through a questioning 
process applied to a working group (which could gather 
for example the risk manager of the facility, people from 
the maintenance, operators, etc.). Each initiating event is 
studied by the working group, using frequency classes. 
Table 6 presents the scale of frequency classes usually 
used. 
 
Table 6. Frequency classes used by INERIS to quantify 
initiating events 
Frequency class Failure frequency 
F-1 Between 1 and 10 per year 
F0 Between 10-1 and 1 per year 
F1 Between 10-2 and 10-1 per year 
F2 Between 10-3 and 10-2 per year 
F3 Between 10-4 and 10-3 per year 
 
Frequencies of initiating events leading to a common 
central event are combined using AND and OR gates: 
- If any of the initiating event can cause the 
central hazardous event, an OR gate is used. In 
that case, the frequency class of the central 
event is equal to the minimum frequency class 
of the initiating event; 
- If multiple initiating events (and the frequency 
of these events are below 10-1) are required for 
the occurrence of the central hazardous event, 
an AND gate is used. In this case, the frequency 
class of the central event is equal to the sum of 
the frequency classes of the required initiating 
event; 
- If a prevention barrier exists, the risk reduction 
factor of the barrier is added to the frequency 
class of the cause, which gives the frequency 
class of the intermediate event.  
 
One of the more obvious advantages of this methodology 
is that it results from a deep analysis of the safety and of 
accident scenarios that could occur, their causes and 
barriers that prevent their occurrence. Therefore, dam 
specific aspects (example: domino effects) and risk 
prevention issues are explicitly taken into account in 
probabilistic calculations. In this framework, operator’s 
safety efforts are well promoted and their effectiveness is 
demonstrated qualitatively and quantitatively. The main 
possible causes of an accident are identified and graded 
in function of their frequency. The operator can, on this 
basis, target the future implementation of its prevention 
system. 
 
As frequency classes are used, this method has several 
limits: the assessment does not aim to be as accurate as 
an assessment using frequency values. This implies an 
increase of uncertainties when there is a need for 
aggregating the probabilities of different dangerous 
phenomena. Besides, some initiating events are difficult 
to assess. This refers mainly to rare events that the 
working group have not observed in their facility or in 
similar facilities. In these cases, generic data on initiating 
events and reliability data can be used, although it also 
implies uncertainties due to the use of generic data on a 
specific situation. An alternative way to assess the 




5. RISK ACCEPTABILITY CRITERIA AND RISK 
REDUCTION 
 
Once severity of consequences and probability of each 
accident determined, the last step of the methodology is 
to assess the risk acceptability for the studied dam. 
 
First, each accident is positioned in a matrix 
corresponding to its severity level (5 levels) and its 
annual probability of occurrence class (5 classes). 
 
Table 7. Risk Matrix 
 Annual Probability of Occurrence 
(E = Very Low ; A = Very High) 
 
Severity E D C B A 
5      
4      
3      
2      
1      
 
Then, the dam owner defined criteria of acceptability in 
order to support the discussions in terms of reducing risk 
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 
following the positioning of the various consequences of 
hazards in the matrix. Since there is no compulsory 
matrix yet, owners generally decide to consider the risk 
acceptance matrix indicated in another French circular 
(circular of May 10th, 2010 which summarizes the 
methodological rules applicable to safety reports, the 
approach of risk reduction at source and plans for 
prevention of technological risks) in which explicit 
classes or additional compensatory measures are 
implemented. This matrix is given below, as an example: 
 
Table 8. Example of Risk Acceptability Matrix 
 Probability  
(E = Very Low ; A = Very High) 
Severity E D C B A 
5      
4      
3      
2      
1      
 
Three classes are defined: 
- Zone at high risk (red); 
- Zone at intermediate risk (orange); 
- Zone at low risk (green). 
 
This gradation corresponds to the priority that can be 
given to risk reduction, focusing first on reducing the 
greatest risks: 
- High risk: Additional Measures to reduce risk at 
source to emerge from the class "High". 
- Intermediate risk: Measures to control the risk 
and possible implementation of those whose 
cost is not disproportionate to the expected 
benefits, 
- Low risk: Given the measures to control the 
risk, no obligation to further reduction, but 
recommendations can be made. 
 
For any accident located in "High Risk" or “Intermediate 
Risk”, the owner has to propose a list of 
recommendations to improve existing safety barriers and 
to identify additional measures if necessary. The aim is 
to reduce the probability and/or the severity level and 
slide the accident to a safer zone. This residual risk level 
is compared with the risk acceptability criteria. 
Additional measures could be established with the aim of 
reducing risk (damages and/or probability) and make if 





To produce dam safety report according to the new 
French regulation, INERIS has developed a methodology 
responding to all required criteria. This methodology has 
been tested on several case studies and it proved 
efficient. However, there is still work to do relative to 
global kinetics to help reduce the max PAR and obtain a 
better approximation of impacted people. This supposes 
to define criteria relative to flow speed and flow height, 
and to be able to assess the time needed to alert and 
evacuate the population. Furthermore, this assessment 
done, reduction factors have still to be decided. Besides, 
another field of study is the probabilistic assessment of 
initiating events, which remains complicated for natural 
hazards and human factors. 
 
It is important to note that the French dam regulation is 
relatively recent and does not define severity level scale, 
probability scale or risk acceptability matrix yet. To be 
able to compare several safety reports, these scales could 
be regulated in the future. The regulation is expected to 
evolve and therefore INERIS methodology may be 
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